問答6：

fer-de-lance 　於　2003/04/27 11:10 
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 
　
Interesting points made about the Battle of Fend Dao over at DTMonline:
　　
>>有人以水手王國成激於義憤，在友人水手李仕茂相助下，兩人裝彈操炮，四發三中擊退吉野，濟遠艦始脫險境為由否定方伯謙奮戰之事實，但是參考濟遠艦火力配置，大家就知道這種説法不過又是缺乏常識的“愛國文人”所放的臭狗屁一通，濟遠艦每門主炮有砲手八人，彈藥手兼預備砲手十餘人，前者操炮瞄準裝彈，後者往返彈艙與砲位搬運彈藥，砲手兩人操作方向機，兩人操作高低機調整火砲方位俯仰，兩人裝彈，一人閉合炮門，一人拉動砲繩擊發，砲手傷亡，則預備砲手替補，王國成李士茂兩人就能操作大炮，連發四炮且三中，這兩人豈非超人？如果真的如此，何以這兩人都不是正選砲手而是甲板水手？攻擊方伯謙的史料中，還繪聲繪色的描述王國成如何身體瘦小，不堪搬運砲彈，振臂高呼何人願助其退敵，友人李仕茂如何挺身而出裝彈擊敵，可惜濟遠的主炮彈重且大，需兩名砲手用推彈桿將彈丸藥包頂入火砲藥室，一人隨即關閉炮閂，三人合作方能裝入，李仕茂真神人，既然一個人就又裝彈又閉閂，一氣呵成，而且連發四彈皆如此。更不要說王國成身兼五人之職，同時操作高低方向機，還能分身到砲位之外測距指揮，拉動炮繩擊發，畢奇功於一瞬，不把這兩人提拔成濟遠艦砲火頭目乃至管帶真是大不公，如果此二人去操作鎮遠定遠上的305mm大炮，豈不是一開戰就把日軍諸艦一一擊沉？怎麽黃海海戰中此二人未建寸功？分明是全艦官兵特別是尾炮砲手在艦長指揮下（這時候方伯謙還在指揮艙指揮作戰，當然還在被人攻擊藏匿不出），利用敵艦掉以輕心的有利戰機，猛擊日艦，濟遠艦一輪快攻，吉野號被連續命中，雖傷勢不重但是吉野為日本第一遊擊隊旗艦，編隊長身處該艦，事關重大，日艦不明濟遠傷情（原來推定濟遠已失去戰力，但是這幾炮把日艦的猜測推翻被誤導它高估了濟遠），放棄追擊返航重新編隊，濟遠僥幸逃離（濟遠艦對敵之際運氣不錯，在豐島和大東溝前後兩次和第一遊擊隊獨立周旋良久爾不沉，結果反而因此坐實了方伯謙膽小避戰的罪名，本艦管帶運氣可謂極差），可見愛國二字，向來是無恥文人為自己不通經濟，愚昧無知之議論做遮羞布，國人雲漢奸克殺者，不乏能員幹吏，中國之愛國每多放屁，中國之文人無非流氓。
　
The description of the large crews needed to load and fire the guns on Tsi Yuen applied only to the two Krupp 8.2in (208mm) Breech Loaders (BL). It is thought that these were 22cal firing 217lb (98.6kg) Armor Piercing (AP) and 174lb (80kg) HE shells. It is obvious that these projectiles would need a couple of people (at least) to lift, load and ram.

（關於濟遠艦火砲需要大量人力操作的論點，一般都僅即於兩門克魯柏8.2吋（208mm）後膛砲（編者註：兩門8.2吋砲均於濟遠艦首的露砲塔），倍徑數為22（編者註：應為35），使用的穿甲彈重217磅（98.6kg），高爆彈重174磅（80kg）。明顯地，這兩種砲彈必須仰賴至少兩名人員進行揚彈、上膛以及射擊）。

However, both of the 8.2in guns were put out of action early in the battle. It was a Krupp 5.9in (150mm) BL gun that was thought to have hit the Yoshino in the bridge. This was the gun mounted aft on the Tsi Yuen which was able to bear on the pursuing Japanese cruisers. The projectiles of of the Krupp 150mm 35 cal BL was 39kg. One person is certainly able to lift and load this projectile. The bagged propellent charges are loaded separately. 

（然而，濟遠艦首這兩門8.2吋艦砲在開戰之初就被敵火解決了，爾後擊中吉野號艦橋的是艦上的一門5.9吋（150mm）克魯柏後膛砲，此砲位於濟遠艦的艦尾砲塔，在戰鬥中抵抗了日艦的追擊。克魯柏150mm砲的倍徑數為35，彈藥重39kg，顯然只需要一名人員進行揚彈與裝填。至於砲彈的裝藥則是與彈頭分開裝填的。）

So, was it possible that the two seamen loaded, rammed the projectiles and then trained, elevated and fired the gun? The answer had to be definitely yes! It would have taken both guys to load and ram. Then both working together could have aimed and fired the gun. (In fact, during that period, many guns of that size could be trained and aimed by one person, eg. 6in 40 cal Armstrong QF and the Krupp 8.8cm QF.)

（所以，濟遠艦這兩名水兵有可能獨自完成上膛、裝藥、瞄準、測量、擊發等所有操砲程序？答案是非常有可能的。兩名水手可能一同完成砲彈的裝填，再一起進行瞄準與發砲。事實上在這個時期，許多火砲能由一名人員完成所有的瞄準與射擊程序，例如6吋40倍徑阿姆斯壯速射砲或克魯柏8.8吋速射砲。）

Remember, the Japanese fired without warning from only 300 yd, resulting in everyone on deck (including all gun crews) killed, wounded or driven below decks. (In all, 3 officers including the XO and 13 enlisted men were killed and 25 wounded; out of a crew of only 180!). For Wang and Li, not part of the normal gun crew, to even try to man the aft 150mm gun took a great deal of courage and initiative. To score a hit was an even greater achievement. (The Japanese only admitted to being hit once - on the bridge of the Yoshino). It would be a great injustice to the memory of these brave men to cast doubts on this act of exceptional bravery - especially if the assumptions about the gun used was not accurate.

（請記得，日方是在300碼的近距離展開無預警射擊，大量殺傷了濟遠艦的甲板人員（尤其是砲手）。全艦總共有3名軍官（含大副）以及13名水兵陣亡，另有25名人員受傷，而整艘濟遠艦的官兵也才不過180名而已。雖然王國成與李仕茂這兩名水兵並非正選砲手，但仍前去操作150mm尾砲反擊日艦，充分展現了積極與勇氣，並擊中日艦至少一次以上（日方只承認一次命中記錄而已，也就是落在吉野艦橋的那一發）。因此，質疑這兩名水兵異常英勇的行動是很不公平的，特別是考慮到當時火砲精確度不佳的情況。）

ra回答

>>>>The projectiles of of the Krupp 150mm 35 cal BL was 39kg.
　　
這一部分我抱有懷疑，40KG的重量幾乎達到了一個成年壯漢體重的一半，要把這麽一發砲彈從甲板下的彈藥箱中取出，裝定引信，運送到炮位，再提升到炮尾用推彈杆頂入，僅僅依靠李仕貿是非常難以想象的，如果是快速連續發射，那就幾乎不可能了，而150mm克式尾炮也有一個炮盾（唯獨這個炮盾我沒有把握說有沒有在之後拆除，我曾看見據説是濟遠自大東溝返回的照片，其中尾炮仍有護盾，但我懷疑那張照片的真實性），所以炮手是根據瞄準手在炮外測量的參數調定火砲的提高提前量，如果炮位上只有一個王國成，那麽他一人操炮的難度就很大（考慮到當時雙方的距離還有3000碼以上，通過炮膛窺視直瞄射擊是不可靠的），所以我才強調這次利用尾炮攻擊是一小群炮手共同行動的結果，爾這也無法派出艦上指揮機關存在的作用
　　
我很感謝fer-de-lance先生的重要補充，我的敍述部分引述自210mm克式前主炮而不是150mm后炮，所以我列舉的炮手數量是不正確的，不過同時也引出了一個新的問題，就是原來被推定傷亡殆盡的正選炮手其實是前主炮的人員，后炮人員不祥，那麽是否在王國成發炮的時候炮手班還幸存或者至少幸存若干人，他們有其了什麽作用？這就無法現在來回答，我想我會盡快從這個角度收集補充，謝謝fer-de-lance提供的重大補充指正
　　
PS：我無意否認中國海軍人員的勇敢健鬥（但我也無意表揚他們，無法影響戰鬥和戰爭結果的勇敢不能過度宣揚，否則就會變成廉價止疼葯來彌合中國人根深蒂固的狂妄自大），我的評論也沒有針對這一點，我希望能指出英雄在戰鬥中的實際作用是有限的，戰鬥是依靠全體官兵共同努力才能進行的，所以我否定那種塑造英雄決定勝負的神話，更否定利用塑造英雄來打壓其他官兵存在作用的做法，這纔是我對王國成炮傷吉野進行考證的理由

此外，對於吉野在300碼偷襲濟遠的紀錄，我非常有興趣，之前我接觸的資料中，從來沒有這樣的記述（日方的資料更是聲稱濟遠在數千碼外先攻），這是很重要的補充(這就更好的解釋了一交火濟遠就人員傷亡器材損失的原因），我想看看相關的介紹?

問答7：

fer-de-lance 　於　2003/04/28 21:42 Q
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 

I am all for an objective discussion of the facts as recorded by various obesrvers. Where there was exceptional bravey - on either side - it is right to recognize it. However, I would agree with you that things should not be blown out of proportion for hero-worship and to attack the C.O. and the normal gun crew.

（我完全是基於客觀的觀點來探討不同的史料記載。當雙方官兵有任何無比英勇的舉動時，都應該受到表揚。當然，我同意你的觀點，也就是任何史蹟不該被英雄主義的心態過度膨脹誇大到不合理的程度。）

If this was a Board of Inquiry, the obvious thing to do is to interview all surviving members of the crew who were topside during the action. Checking the casualty lists of the aft 15cm gun crew could also help establish how much of a role Wang and Li played in hitting the Yoshino.

（如果這是一個調查委員會，最應該做的就是去訪談事發時位於甲板上的生還人員。如能對照濟遠15cm尾砲操砲人員的傷亡紀錄，對於釐清王國成與李仕茂在砲打吉野時扮演的角色應該是有幫助的。）

I am also interested in whether there was a smear campaign to blame the C.O. and the gun crew. It is almost certain that some of the 15cm gun crew would have been hit in the initial barrage by the Japanese. Perhaps most of the 15cm gun crew had become casualties. If there were surviving members of the gun crew that helped get off the 4 rounds - they should also be recognized. More research is needed.

（至於是否有存在著對指揮官（編者註：濟遠管帶方伯謙）以及砲組人員的惡意毀謗，我也感到興趣。相當可信的是，在吉野發起攻擊之初，顯然已有部分濟遠15cm尾砲人員蒙受傷亡。也許15cm尾砲的人員在戰鬥中悉數傷亡，如果有任何此砲組的生還者參與了隨後攻擊吉野艦的四次發砲，照理說他們應該也會被表揚。顯然這需要經過更多的研究。）

As for the weight of the 15cm projectile. It is normal practice for one person to lift and load this or the even heavier (45kg) British 6in projectile. Normally, there would be multiple loaders each holding a projectile and one person dedicated to ramming - all to achieve a higher rate of fire. If most of the gun crew became casualties, and only two men are available (and both are physically challenged), I would have both guys lift the projectile. Load it, ram it, load the propellent, close the breech - and then train, aim and fire. As for ammunition, it is normally hoisted up from magazine below decks. The ammo hoist crew - being below decks - were probably still intact. There is also likely to be ready use ammo on the mount itself.

（至於15cm砲彈重量的問題，只靠一名人員去揚彈與上膛是很正常的，甚至重量更大（45kg）的英國6吋砲彈亦是如此。一般而言，這門火砲編制多名砲手，每一名砲手負責一枚砲彈，此外還有一名人員專司擊發，如此能達到較高的射速。換作是我，如果砲手大部分傷亡，只剩二名人員可用（當然此時他們的體力負荷就比較大），我會讓兩人一同進行揚彈、上膛、裝發射藥、閉鎖、瞄準與擊發。）。在彈藥補充方面，砲彈都是由下甲板的彈藥庫吊運至上甲板砲位，而負責彈藥吊運的下甲板人員應該是完好無傷的。此外，砲位上的人員也可能自行備妥彈藥進行射擊。）

I am not sure of the exact arrangement on the Krupp 15cm but a smaller Krupp 8.8cm gun of the period had two large hand wheels for training and pointing (elevation) that could be operated by one person. An Armstrong 6in gun of the period also used only one gun-layer who can operate two hand wheels for both training and pointing. So, one man could have aimed and another fired the gun.

（我不太確定克魯柏15cm砲的設計，而同時期小一號的克魯柏8.8吋砲則擁有兩個大型手動控制盤負責調整砲身的水平方位與俯仰角度，僅需一名人員就能操作。同時期的阿姆斯壯 6吋速射砲也僅編制一名人員來操縱兩個負責調整砲身方位、俯仰的控制盤來進行瞄準。因此，一名人員進行瞄準，另一人負責擊發，這是可行的。）

One of the most comprehensive (and objective) accounts from the view point of a trained naval observer was one by Fred T Jane - founder of Janes Fighting Ships. He made use of info from both sides.

（一份內容最廣泛客觀的紀錄來自於海軍觀察家佛瑞德,湯瑪斯.詹（著名的詹氏防衛週刊的創始者），他引用了中日雙方的資訊。）

The Japanese fired first without warning - there is not disputing that. The one important clue about the intial range comes from the Japanese insistence that they fired because they thought Tsi Yuen was closing in for a torpedo attack. As I had mentioned before, the effective range of torpedoes of the period is only a few hundred yards. That would be consistent with the account for a 300yd range when fire was first opened.

（日方在無預警情況下率先朝濟遠艦開火是無庸置疑的事實。關於雙方開始交火時的距離，有個重要的線索，就是日方堅稱由於濟遠艦正在迫近並準備發動魚雷攻擊，才會先開砲攻擊。如我前文所述，當時魚雷的有效射程只有數百碼，這就是雙方首次交火時距離只有300碼的有力佐證。）

Jane recounted that the Japanese claimed that they broke off the chase because they thought the Tsi Yuen was leading them into a trap. They also claimed that only one 15cm hit was scored on the bridge of the Yoshino. More credit should, perhaps, be given to Kwang Yi for her sacrifice. She charged in for a torpedo attack which had to be dealt with. She claimed a hit on the Matsushima (probably the Yoshino) with her 4.7in (120mm) QF guns. Her sacrifice and the time the Japanese spent on shelling her after she went aground probably gave more time for the Tsi Yuen to escape.

（詹氏表示，日方宣稱最後停止追擊濟遠的原因，是因為他們推測濟遠將一路帶領日艦進入設伏的圈套。日方也宣稱濟遠只有一發15cm砲彈打在吉野號上，落於艦橋。而吉野艦上其他的彈孔則有可能是來自於廣乙艦的射擊。廣乙艦曾準備進行魚雷攻擊，但最後仍遭到壓制。廣乙宣稱以4.7吋砲擊中松島（ 此為誤認，可能指吉野）。廣乙犧牲了自我，不過她與日艦周旋之舉使日艦花費更多時間來對付她，這很可能為濟遠艦爭取了更多撤退的時間。）

ra回答
>>>Perhaps most of the 15cm gun crew had become casualties. 
　
很遺憾暫時我無法從正面回答這個問題，從我這一天的收穫來看，我只能找到一份濟遠艦很粗略的傷亡名單，這是殘缺的（僅有二十余人）而且嚴重缺乏傷亡人員的詳細描述，因此我無法確認究竟有多少后炮手戰死或幸存，我想可能等我會利用出差的機會就近去劉公島博物館查一下當地的資料。但我認爲從一個旁證中可以看出后炮手的傷亡可能比前主炮要好一些，那就是對比火砲的情況，在這次海戰中濟遠的前主炮不僅失去了他的大部分炮手，連大炮本身也被擊壞（可見其實阿式6寸速射主炮的威力比預想的要高一些，即使是彈片而非彈丸也能較爲有效的破壞器材），而後主炮則很明顯的一直奮戰到了最後，這一點上我們可以概略的估計后主炮被彈的情況應該是少於前主炮的，那麽理論上我們也可以對后炮手的生存幾率給予較高的預期 
　　 
〉〉〉 but a smaller Krupp 8.8cm gun of the period had two large hand wheels for training and pointing (elevation) that could be operated by one person
　　
但我認爲考慮到克式88毫米炮和阿式6寸炮其實是後期發展的速射炮，在定裝彈，彈性炮架，油性复進技術等技術上要比濟遠的尾炮先進，所以在快速裝彈方面兩者的對比性爲何還值得考慮，所以我想我可能會把這一點列入下一步考察的項目中，目前對甲午戰爭中武器的具體研究与考證還是一個薄弱的環節，我很有興趣進行這一方面的進一步考證分析，當然更加歡迎fer-de-lance先生這樣的有識之士提供自己的寶貴知識与見解，先行謝過
　　 
〉〉〉they broke off the chase because they thought the Tsi Yuen was leading them into a trap

這一部分和中國現在總結的資料有比較大的差距，中國提供的濟遠艦航海日誌上註明日艦先入牙山灣口，后轉向東航行，再轉西行，雙方距離3000米交戰開始，而日本海軍的《二十七八年海戰史》則宣稱中方濟遠戰艦在這個距離上首先炮擊日艦，但目前以中方的紀錄為准（也就是7時45分交火論），你舉薦的佛理得簡先生聲稱日方自承首先開炮且距離極近是一個很新鮮的補充，請提供原書的名稱，我想設法代購一本作爲閲讀查證及收藏之用
　　
〉〉〉 Her sacrifice and the time the Japanese spent on shelling her after she went aground probably gave more time for the Tsi Yuen to escape. 
　　
事實上廣乙重傷退出戰鬥僅有浪速前往追擊，而秋津州轉向去圍攻濟遠，而吉野始終在攻擊濟遠（雖然廣乙試圖對他進行魚雷攻擊），最後因爲發現廣乙火勢太大，艦體殘破已不堪使用，日艦全部放棄追擊，轉身圍攻濟遠，所以說濟遠最後能逃出生天實在是狗運當頭（以常理計濟遠十死無生），基本上廣乙的犧牲沒有產生必然的價值，不過我們也應該肯定廣乙苦戰的功勞，至少它和日艦苦戰到全艦起火，人員傷亡2/3才退出戰鬥，于情于理已經是戰至最後了，沒有能更多的支援濟遠也無可厚非

問答8：

NO:240_24
　　 
fer-de-lance 　於　2003/05/01 13:28
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 
　　 
Janes book was called the Imperial Japanese Navy and was published in 1904. The book is out of print - I would have bought one if it was available. Alas it is not - not easily found any way. I have exerpts e-mailed to me by a friend.Wright in The Chinese Steam Navy publ 2000, Chatham Publishing, London also said the range was close. Three thousand yards was long for the period - in the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, Deweys squadron managed a hit rate of 2.4% - at targets that were anchored(!) That only reflects the level of technology of the period.

（詹氏出版的這本書名叫「日本帝國海軍」，1904年出版。這本書已經絕版，如果弄得到手，我也會購買一本，當然要找到它是極為困難的。經過友人的介紹，我獲得一個相關專家的e-mail帳號。在2000年在英國出版的「審視中國的蒸汽海軍」一書中也說明這個時期的艦隊交火距離非常近。對這個時期而言，3000碼的交戰距離算是很長了──在1898年的馬尼拉灣戰役中，德韋艦隊攻擊停泊目標的命中率竟然只有2.4%！這只能說此時期相關科技仍然太原始。至於15cm克魯柏後膛砲，他允許同時兩人或只有一人在砲座上進行火砲瞄準，所以先前問題的答案是肯定的。）

The key difference between the BL and QF guns of the period was not in the mounting and travesring mechanisms. Recoil buffers and fast travesing mechanisms have been in use for some time before the QF breech and fixed or semi-fixed ammo became available. US Navy BL guns of the period had recoild buffers and fast tarversing mechanisms - they just lacked the interrupted screw breech and fixed ammo to make them QF - or RF rapid fire as they called it.For a gun that size (15 cm), mountings of the period such as the Vavasser would have allowed traversing by a single person turning a hand wheel.

（這個時期後膛砲與速射砲的主要不同並非在砲座與旋轉機構上。在速射砲出現之前，駐退復進機以及快速迴旋基座已經被部分火砲所使用，固定或半固定式彈藥（編者註：固定式彈藥係裝藥與砲彈整合為一體，半固定式則是砲彈分成彈頭與裝藥兩部分，發射時予以組合即可。）也已經出現。美國海軍在這個時期的後膛砲都擁有駐退復進機以及快速迴旋機構，它們與速射砲（英國人稱為Quick Fire，美國人則稱之為Rapid Fire）相比只缺乏中斷螺紋砲閂以及固定式彈藥而已。同時期的砲座設計如瓦瓦瑟型，便能一人操控手動轉盤進行迴旋動作。）
　　
You are quite right in pointing out that Yoshino was always chasing the Tsi Yuen. The attack by the Kwang Yi probably ooly diverted the Naiwa and the Akitsushima from chasing the Tsi Yuen. Yoshino, with her speed advantage, should have had no problems overtaking the Tsi Yuen. Wright also pointed this out and said it was a mystery why Yoshino did not catch and sink the Tsi Yuen. He speculated that the 15 cm hit on the bridge probably affected the Yoshino more than the Japanese would like to admit.

（你的觀點是正確的，整場戰鬥中吉野始終在追擊濟遠而沒有跑去攻擊廣乙。廣乙的開火只吸引了秋津州與浪速兩艦撇下濟遠前去攻擊。以吉野佔優勢的航速，絕對有能力徹底壓倒濟遠。這本書同時指出，在這樣的絕對優勢之下，為何吉野沒有繼續追擊並擊沈濟遠，是一個難解的謎題。因此他推測濟遠那發命中吉野艦橋的15cm砲彈對吉野艦造成的影響，可能超過日本所公開的資料。）

So, the evidence again point to the aft 15 cm gun of the Tsi Yuen playing a significant role - whether it was Wang and Li doing it by themselves or in conjunction with the surviving members of the gun crew.

（因此，相關證據再度顯示濟遠的15cm尾砲在這場作戰中扮演顯著的角色，無論操砲的是王國成與李仕茂這兩名甲板水兵，或者是艦尾倖存的砲組人員。）

這篇文章最後由ra在 2003/05/01 04:50pm 第 1 次編輯

〉〉〉Janes book was …………………… Chatham Publishing,
　
我會和英國的同事聯係購買收藏的，多謝您提供的信息
　　
〉〉〉 in the battle of Manila Bay in 1898, Deweys squadron managed a hit rate of 2.4% - at targets that were anchored(!) That only reflects the level of technology of the period.
　　
所以我從來不追究爲什麽北洋艦隊的命中率在賬面上看偏低，因爲以當時的條件看命中率在一到兩個巴仙就相當不錯了,還有一票命中率在小數點以下的例子呢
　　
〉〉〉He speculated that the 15 cm hit on the bridge probably affected the Yoshino more than the Japanese would like to admit.
　　
我倒認爲日本人事後的解釋（擔心濟遠把他們引入了中國艦隊主力的包圍圈）也是能説明問題的，作爲日本分艦隊的旗艦，吉野號沒有理由冒自己這樣的一只小艦隊去挑戰中國海軍的主力的風險，更何況當時他還抛掉其他遼艦。所以在當時的情況下吉野退出追擊在邏輯上說得通>>>>有個問題：依照當時的技術，方伯謙有辦法在艙內指揮嗎？他怎麼看得到敵艦？還是需要有些小兵留在露天艦橋報告敵艦方位，然後在艙內瞄跡？
　　
依靠傳聲管就可以連通指揮艙和各艙位，必要的時候還有傳令兵，但監測敵艦方位和提供射擊諸元是炮術軍官和炮長的工作（按照前主炮的操作方法），直接在航海台和砲位上完成，所以這一仗濟遠一連在航海台附近戰死了三個艦上主要軍官（所以我非常傾向于fer-de-lance先生提供的300碼交戰說，這就完全解釋了這種迅雷不及掩耳的大量傷亡是如何造成的）
　　
問答9：

NO:240_27
　
fer-de-lance 　於　2003/05/09 11:21 
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 

Yes, you can see out of the armored conning tower which is the normal battle station for the C.O.. Commands are relayed via voice tubes. However, the Tsi Yuen was running away from the enemy. The view aft from the conning tower of any ship is limited. Question is, was the C.O. in the conning tower all this time

（沒錯，傳統海戰中指揮官所在的場所，就是暴露在外的指揮台。作戰指令透過傳聲筒來傳遞。然而，當濟遠艦在退出戰場的階段，指揮塔對艦尾方向的視野是相當有限的，這對於任何船艦都一樣。問題在於，當時濟遠指揮官是否全時間待在指揮塔上？）

Director control of guns have not yet been developed then. There were also no optical range-finders. According to McGiffin, range was estimated from an observer from the foretop by a simple depression range-finding sight which measures the angle from the horizontal to the waterline of the enemy ship. Knowing the height of your own mast to the foretop position you can estimate the range to the target by trigonometry using the angle the sight has to be depressed to align with the waterline of the target

（這個時期，指揮火砲的射控系統尚未出現，當時也沒有光學測距儀可供使用。依照麥吉芬所言，當時測量距離的方法是仰賴一名站在全艦最高處（編者註：即桅樓）的人員進行簡單的俯瞰式測量──測量水平線到敵艦水線之間的夾角。由於桅樓的高度是已知，利用簡單的三角測量便能大致估算敵艦的距離。）

If (I remember my trig correctly ...)
　
a = the height of the mast
　　
D = the angle the sight is depressed to align with the waterline of the target
　　
R = slant range to the target
　　
then (with cos(90 - D) = a/R
　　
R = a/cos(90 - D)2

（如果我沒記錯的話，以上計算有一套公式可循：

a = 桅杆高度

D = 從高處俯瞰船舷水平線到敵艦之間的夾角

R=大致的目標距離

則 (with cos(90 - D) = a/R
　　
R = a/cos(90 - D)2）

The depression range-finder sight was probably calibrated to directly give range readings for each depression angle. The range estimates are not very precise, especially if the ship was pitching and rolling heavily and gun smoke obscures the waterline.

（配合這種測距機制，可能已經訂出每一種測得的角度對應的目標距離。這種測距方式並不精準，特別是在船身劇烈搖晃或者是火砲煙硝阻礙觀測視線的時候。）
　　
With the Yoshino pursuing so closely at the time, the 150mm Krupp would have been firing open open sights (at close to point blank range). Range estimates from the foretop would not have been very useful at that time, especially given the decimated gun crews and difficulties relaying data. (Flags were probably used from the foretop to the gun).

（當吉野號以相當接近的距離窮追濟遠之際，濟遠的150mm克魯柏尾砲幾乎壓到最低角度朝目標直射。這種時候桅杆頂的測距作業並不十分管用，尤其是當砲手傷亡慘重以及難以傳遞更新的射擊資料之際（此時桅樓測量員與砲位之間可能得靠旗號溝通）（編者註：因為全艦通話道此時已經被擊破失效）

〉〉〉Question is, was the C.O. in the conning tower all this time?

暫時沒有其他的描述，不論是為方伯謙辯護還是攻擊，都承認方伯謙除去接戰之初一段時間（應該還不足十分鈡），一直在司令塔

問答10：

NO:240_30
　　
fer-de-lance 　於　2003/05/09 23:20 
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬 
　　 
In the Battle off Anshan, Fang cannot be attacked for leaving the exposed bridge and going to the conning tower - especially after the casualties on the bridge from enemy fire. Faced with overwhelming forces and the loss of the main guns early in the battle, he had little choice but to try and escape.

（在豐島海戰中，要指責方伯謙離開露天指揮台而進入裝甲指揮室是不公平的，特別是在濟遠指揮台中彈並造成大量傷亡之際。當面對敵方壓倒性武力優勢，加上艦首主砲在開戰未久便遭癱瘓，方伯謙除了脫離戰場之外，並沒有太多選擇。）

What he could be faulted for was the initial maneuvres and the material condition of the Tsi Yuen. A steering failure left her unable to change course. She kept heading straight for the Japanese ships - looked very provocative to the Japanese who thought she was trying to make a torpedo attack. 

The white flag might have been flown at this time to signal no hostile intentions - (not after the battle started to feign surrender). But clearly, it did not have the desired effect - the Japanese opened fire. 

（方伯謙可能被指責之處是一開始的操艦以及發生在濟遠的實際情況。由於舵輪系統失效，導致濟遠無法控制航向，迫使她只能維持直線航向並朝日本艦隊而去；當日本艦隊懷疑濟遠可能準備發動魚雷攻擊之際，這種舉動是非常具有挑釁意味的。濟遠的白旗可能是在這種情況下懸掛的，以表明她接近日艦的行動沒有敵意（這與後來戰鬥中濟遠掛白旗詐降是不同的事）。當然，事情的發展並未按照方伯謙的期望，日艦還是開火了。）

ra回覆

>>>>The white flag might have been flown at this time to signal no hostile intentions - (not after the battle started to feign surrender)

問題的焦點集中在追擊時　

問答11：

〉〉〉一說是方伯謙畏戰先逃
　
他不是第一個跑的，但是他是第一個回來的，因爲挑頭跑的廣甲觸礁被放棄，根本沒回來
　　
〉〉〉另一說則是方伯謙私自脫隊追擊，後來砲彈耗盡後自行撤退
　　
胡説八道，濟遠為北洋最弱戰艦之一，又在隊形最左側，且囘港后尚有彈藥，談不上追擊敵艦之彈藥耗盡，但是他很可能被第一遊擊隊追擊了一段時間，方伯謙先回的理由是炮盤融化而不是彈藥耗盡
　　
〉〉〉伊東佑亨問程璧光「方伯謙能戰，為何殺之？」
　　
孤證，未現于正史和日方資料，所以一般不倸信（我就拒絕引用這一段逸聞）但日方記錄顯示他們可能在黃海追擊了濟遠（他們記錄說追擊了平遠，可在那個時間段平遠沒有到，所以他們追的很可能是濟遠

〉〉〉很多人都拿此事跟東鄉對比：東鄉在對馬海峽大戰中始終待在三笠露天艦橋上指揮 
　　
還有一個例子就是北洋艦隊的丁汝昌司令，他也在指揮艙外觀戰結果被自己的火砲引發的風暴摔傷，幸虧他本來也不負責指揮艦隊，如果方伯謙在航海臺上像沈壽昌柯建章黃承勳一樣被打死，濟遠失去指揮，這樣會不會顯得方伯謙就克盡職守了呢？這種問題就好像問山口多聞如果不把自己捆在飛龍號上自沉是不是膽小一樣，這不是一個用膽量能衡量的問題，而是一個這樣做有沒有必要的問題

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