10問答集2：「日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬」2

問答4：

fer-de-lance 　於　2003/04/08 10:45
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬
　　
〉〉〉〉 Trouble Ive found with quite a few of the Chinese accounts of the battle is that they were not written by people familiar with fleet tactics and technology of that period.
　　
>怎麽會有這種人存在呢^^ 如果是一手資料，必然是當事人留下的，就算是轉述，也要靠當事人的親友整理，所以資料不可能排除人爲的修飾，只能再考慮當時的一些客觀因素限制來一一考證這些資料的真僞
　　
I am referring to so-called historical accounts published in China - plenty of nationalistic rhetoric and mythology but deficient in informed critical analysis. Some of the accounts published in Taiwan - eg. Detailed Account of Ching Dynasty Wars by Loh Yun, publ. 1975, Hsiang Yun Publishing, Taipei - are more objective. However, they do a good job describe what happened but do little analysis of WHY things happened.

（我指的是中國方面所謂的「歷史紀錄」──過多充滿民族情緒的浮誇敘述以及神話，缺乏在事實關鍵之處進行有素養的分析。而台灣部分的書籍，如1975年出版的清代戰爭史，就客觀得多，然而它們雖然在敘述史實的部分尚稱可圈可點，但在分析為何歷史如此發展則論述不多。）
　　
There needs to be more Operations Research-based discussions exactly like this one we are having. A key lesson for us today is that superiority is not gained by simply having the most powerful weapon. It is far more important to have the most appropriate for the expected opponent.

（我們需要更多這類屬於研究性質的討論，就像這一篇一樣。這段歷史給我們最寶貴的一課，就是單憑武器是不足以獲得整體優勢的，這在面對勢均力敵的可能對手時更形重要。）
　　
Ultimately, the big battleships with thick armor and big 12inch Krupp guns could not defeat armored cruisers. It was a result of the limitations of the technology of that time. Naval fire controls were very primitive then. Guns were laid individually, salvo fire and spotting is virtually unknown. Effective engagement ranges were less than 3,000 yards, ie. point-blank range no matter what size guns you are talking about.

（最好的例子，就是兩軍中最大型、裝甲最厚、擁有12吋克魯柏重砲的鐵甲艦竟然打不過敵方的巡洋艦。這是因為當時科技水平的限制，當時海軍艦艇的火砲射控技術仍相當原始，每一門火砲都是個別進行瞄準與射擊，而齊射與點放等觀念都還沒有出現。因此，當時雙方艦艇交火的距離多半不到3000碼（編者註：因為觀瞄距離與準確度太差），此時火砲口徑的差別可說是毫無影響）。

The major caliber guns in the battle - 12inch Krupps and 12.6inch Canets - had relatively short barrels and low muzzle velocity. Theoretically, they could shoot farther but, with a high trajectory, they not expect to hit anything consistently beyond a couple of thousand yards. These guns were needed against a battleship threat because they were the only ones capable of penetrating heavy armor. A heavily armored battleship would be slow and have similar limitations in gunnery. They would need to come close to you to use their own guns effectively. Against a close and slow target, the 12inch Krupp would have been effective.

（中日雙方口徑最大的火砲──定遠、鎮遠的12吋克魯柏砲以及日方三景艦的12.6吋加農砲，倍徑數與砲口初速都偏低。理論上，這兩種大口徑火砲都具有較遠的射程，但當這兩種火砲採取高仰角射擊以延長射程時，以當時的精準度而言，很難穩定地命中2000碼以外的目標。如果面對戰鬥艦（編者註，當時真正所謂的近代化戰鬥艦尚未出現，定遠、鎮遠只能算是過渡型的鐵甲艦）之類的目標，這種巨砲是必須的，只有它們才有足夠的能力來穿透戰鬥艦的厚重裝甲。然而，擁有重甲巨砲的戰鬥艦存在著航速緩慢以及前述的火砲特性限制。因此，她們必須在較為接近的距離，才能有效發揮火砲的威力。在近距離以低角度彈道射擊目標時，定遠的12吋克魯柏砲是很有效的武器。）
　　
Problem was, the other guy didn t have slow battleships but a Flying Squadron of cruisers. Against the faster cruiser targets, the low rate of fire, slow traverse and high trajectory made these guns much less likely to score hits. That is why I said you needed a secondary battery of 5.9inch Krupp QF or Armstrong 6inch QF - for an anti-cruiser role - not the Hotchkiss or Nordenfeldt 47mm 3pdr or 57mm 6pdr for fighting torpedoboats.

（不過，北洋水師的對手所配備的並不是龐大而緩慢的戰鬥艦，而是航速極高的巡洋艦，12吋克魯伯砲這種射速緩慢且彈道角度較高的武器很難命中如此高速的目標。這就是我認為除了主砲之外，還需要5.9吋克魯伯砲或6吋阿姆斯壯速射砲來對付巡洋艦這類速度較快的目標──我指的不是用來對抗魚雷艇的哈乞開斯或諾登福特47mm或57mm速射砲。）

Director fire control which made long range (9,000+ yd) engagements with heavy guns effective was still more than 10 years away. That s what made a single caliber main armament of the Dreadnought practical. Before that, it didnt matter if you had many different calibers. But even after director fire control of a single caliber main battery, you still need a secondary armament against torpedo firing light cruisers and destroyers. This consisted initially of 4inch QF and later 6inch QF for for dealing with improved, longer ranged torpedoes.

（能在9000碼以外指揮重型火砲有效接戰的射控技術，要等到甲午戰爭十多年以後才會成熟，而這種技術便使得英國無畏級戰艦得以實現。在這之前，由於接戰距離過短，使用多種不同口徑的火砲也沒有什麼差別。但即便是射控系統指揮單一口徑主砲群的時代來臨後，戰鬥艦仍需要次級武裝，在近距離的魚雷戰中對抗敵方輕巡洋艦與驅逐艦。而由於魚雷射程日益增加，也促使了戰艦配備4吋或6吋速射砲來加以因應。）
　　
Strongly agree with the last paragraph but would like to add that a winning navy is one that learns from its defeats. The finest display of forward looking and adaptive development of systems to fit operational needs in the ROCN came after the defeats of 1965 and the emergence of the antiship cruise missile threat. The improvisation of a main gun stabilized director fire control system using aircraft gyros to meet the needs of a FAC threat was brillant. This was especially so under the difficult circumstances back then - the system was developed from practically no technology base and it worked. The other example of excellence was the indigenous combat systems program culminating in the H930 MCS.Resources then were scarce, the political situation very tough but that didnt stop the likes of Dr Han Kuang Wei. It is easy to be discouraged by the setbacks of the last few years. But as I said earlier, a winning navy learns from its past defeats - it should also emulate the Can-Do attitude of its successful predecessors.

（我非常同意ra回覆的最後一段文字，不過我必須補充一點，就是勝利的海軍是從失敗的經驗中學習教訓。對中華民國海軍而言，最能顯示其前瞻眼光並吸收新系統的發展來滿足其需求的一段史實，就是1965年海戰失利以及稍後反艦飛彈威脅興起的那段時間。在這段艱困的時局，國軍即興地利用航空用陀螺儀，開發具有良好穩定機制的主砲射控指揮系統；雖然背後沒有良好的技術基礎，但這個克難的系統的成效十分卓著。此後，中華民國海軍艦艇進行戰系化，引進H-930系列戰鬥系統，也是個眼光前瞻的良好實例。雖然資源匱乏，背後政治環境也十分艱困，但這並未阻止韓光渭博士等海軍軍工人才。雖然中華民國海軍近幾年遇到的發展挫折令人喪氣，不過如我前文所說，一支勝利的海軍要從過去的失敗中吸取教訓，此外也要仿效當年海軍前輩有志者事竟成的態度。）

代ra兄轉回應fer-de-lance之問題，如下：

〉〉〉〉 The major caliber guns in the battle - 12inch Krupps and 12.6inch Canets - had relatively short barrels and low muzzle velocity. ……………………not the Hotchkiss or Nordenfeldt 47mm 3pdr or 57mm 6pdr for fighting torpedoboats78
　　
我完全理解您的看法，我也贊同您對北洋艦隊臨戰前應當增加中口徑速射炮的看法，我只是以一種海軍長期建設的觀點來做分析，我認爲作爲正確的（當然這種正確建立在我預知了戰艦發展的未來這一前提之上）做法，應當確認的是主力艦的任務是也始終是遠距離的交戰以擊毀對方的主力艦。承擔騷擾突襲和反騷擾突襲任務的是巡洋艦和魚雷艇（也包括即將成熟的驅逐艦），不能讓主力艦將注意力轉移到攻擊對方的快速艦艇身上，因爲這樣不僅會造成主力艦無法發揮自己強大戰鬥力的優勢一面（遠射程，大威力）被迫在不利的一面交戰（即便有速射炮，由於運動性的限制戰艦和快速艦艇交戰還是處於先天不利的地位），而且還造成了主力艦無法執行自己的關鍵使命——擊毀對方的主力艦

所以在組成一只強大的主力艦隊時，必須要明確分工，主力艦的任務就是專心于發揚遠程火力；巡洋艦隊的任務就是哨戒追蹤，騷擾對方主力艦和驅逐對方快速戰艦以保護己方主力艦戰列完整等等輔助任務，所以從根本上說，應該以強化巡洋艦為對抗對方快速艦艇威脅的手段，主力艦武裝次口徑副炮只能是一種補充，不能作爲主要的手段，必須用快速戰艦來驅逐快速戰艦，以輔助戰艦來牽制輔助戰艦。儅然這一切建設在一個前提條件上，就是真正意義的戰列艦產生

正因爲有您所提出的種種戰術和技術上的不成熟所限制，所以我始終都認爲北洋艦隊的發展叢了一個錯誤的軌道，不應該把定遠級鐵甲艦作爲重點，因爲這種戰艦距離真正意義的主力艦還有相當差距（編者註：因為當時的射控瞄準技術尚不足以支援大口徑艦砲較遠的射程，使得實質射程無法拉開，甚至定遠、鎮遠的舊式30cm克魯柏砲本身就因倍徑數太小，射程跟日本艦隊為數眾多的新型中口徑速射砲相較完全討不到便宜。因此，定遠、鎮遠在實戰中並無法享有高於日方巡洋艦的實質射程，雙方都在可以彼此殺傷對方的距離內互轟，而定遠、鎮遠反而由於火砲射速太差、船速太慢等技術落後而吃足苦頭，本身中彈累累卻無法大量殺傷敵艦。此外，定遠、鎮遠這種鐵甲艦因航速過慢，不敷勝任在遠洋奪取制海權的任務。不過當時近代海軍相關技術、戰術仍在摸索發展階段，可謂百家爭鳴，經過十餘年的焠煉後才出現真正成熟而有效的主流體系。），不能依靠這種戰艦為核心構成一個遠洋艦隊，在遠洋作戰中應當以火力強速度快而且具有一定防護能力的鐵甲巡洋艦爲主要打擊力量（類似日本戰果巨大的第一遊擊隊），在真正意義的戰列艦產生之前，鐵甲艦只能充當輔助牽制任務。北洋艦隊的根本弱點在於從來沒有清晰的認知自己的各種技術裝備在海戰中的作用，就更加談不上基於這種認識來正確的定位和安排各種艦艇發揮作用。將帶有很大的淺水炮艦色彩的戰艦與帶有遠洋艦隊（即使是輔助艦艇）色彩的戰艦混編在一起，看起來規模可觀其實究其本質是一團糟。所以從根本上說，北洋艦隊就是一種甚至在硬体建設上先天不良的雜牌艦隊。
　　
其實從上一次的回應開始我就跑題了，我不是在回應您對北洋艦隊的問題進行的討論，而是衍生到了一個新的命題：北洋艦隊的硬体建設重點何在而展開，抱歉^^
　　
〉〉〉〉 you still need a secondary armament against torpedo firing light cruisers and destroyers. This consisted initially of 4inch QF and later 6inch QF for for dealing with improved, longer ranged torpedoes.
　　
這個部分實際上就是我抱有一點的地方，兩個主力艦隊交火，輔助戰艦是否能突破對方的遠程火力和快速艦艇的攔截，接近到對方主力艦的次口徑副炮範圍内呢？我認爲結合日德蘭大海戰和對馬海戰的過程來看，戰列艦和巡洋艦的搭配得當就能迫使對方的輔助艦艇無法展開戰鬥（雖然日本魚雷艇取得了大戰果，但是那是在俄國太平洋第二艦隊艦列綳散，而且戰艦被擊沉擊傷多艘的情況下，也就是主力艦已經被對方擊敗的前提下），除非在夜暗霧大視野不良的天氣或者意外情況，否則巡洋艦，驅逐艦和魚雷艇難以迫近到對方主力艦附近發起攻擊（當然蘇裏高海戰或者提供了我們不同的證據，但是要考慮這場戰鬥的信息優勢非常不平衡）
　　
〉〉〉adaptive development of systems to fit operational needs in the ROCN came after the defeats of 1965
　　
原來是崇武以東海戰（65海戰），我還在想1965年在東海發生了哪一次大海戰呢^^
(PS.RYAN2181註....86海戰)

問答5：

fer-de-lance 　於　2003/04/10 13:26 #48^Yc
Re:日清黃海海戰之評論---請各位協助指出誤謬
　
Regarding torpedo attacks in fleet actions, the levels of technology during the Battles of Yalu, Tsushima and Jutland were all different. Prior to 1896, torpedoes did not have gyro stabilization and could only shoot accurately for just a few hunderd yards. The torpedoboats were small and could be dealt with using 47mm or 57mm guns. However, by that time, fast and accurate 4inch and 6inch QF guns had become available. They would have been quite effective against contemporary torpedoboats. Thats probably why the Japanese did not bring them to the battle.

（關於艦隊作戰中的魚雷攻擊，在大東溝海戰、對馬海峽海戰以及日德蘭海戰的相關科技背景都是不一樣的。在1896年之前，魚雷並沒有陀螺儀穩定機制，只能在射出後的數百碼內維持可接受的精準度。當時魚雷艇體積極小，47mm或57mm速射砲便能對付；不過在此同時，4吋或6吋的速射砲也日漸普及，這用來對付當時的魚雷艇而言是十分有效，而這可能是日本海軍不願意在作戰中（編者註：此處係指艦隊決戰，日本魚雷艇在甲午與日俄戰爭中都只在夜間偷襲時出動）使用魚雷艇的原因。）

The Chinese torpedoboats led by the Kwang Bing were able to make an attack only because the target - a converted merchantman - was already damaged. Nevertheless, the two torpedoes launched both missed - probably due to poor stability or depth keeping. The one that ran under the target may have been due ironically to the Chinese boat coming in too close. The fish did not have time to climb back and stabilize at its proper run depth after being launched. Shoot too far out and the thing runs wild because of no gyro, wait too long and the thing runs under

（由廣丙巡洋艦率領的北洋魚雷艇（編者註，此處指福龍號）在海戰中有機會發動攻擊，只是因為那艘改裝商船（編者註：即特設巡洋艦西京丸）已經受傷。雖然如此，福龍射出的前兩發魚雷都沒有擊中目標，這可能是由於當時魚雷缺乏穩定與定深能力所致；諷刺的是，福龍的第三發魚雷之所以從目標下方穿越，是因為福龍號衝得太靠近目標，魚雷射出入水後還來不及浮回正常深度。如果在距離太遠處發射魚雷，當時還沒有陀螺儀的魚雷就會射歪，而且魚雷航行時間過久，目標便避過了魚雷的航道。）

It is worth noting that the Japanese torpedoboat that sank the Ting Yuen had to sneak into the Weihaiwei anchorage behind two Chinese torpedoboats. Even then, it had to get so close to ensure a hit that she herself was sunk by the Ting Yuen s secondary battery.

（即便那艘偷襲定遠艦的日本魚雷艇成功地潛入了威海錨地並躲過前方兩艘北洋魚雷艇，用處也不大；為了確保擊中定遠，那艘魚雷艇必須迫近目標，雖然魚雷擊中定遠，但魚雷艇本身也被定遠的副砲擊毀。）

By the time of Jutland, torpedoes with gyro and improved propulsion technology could go 4,000+ yards. There was also the ability to fire spreads to increase hit probability. The destroyers were also bigger, faster and more robust. Having a screen of light cruisers and destroyers was vital to counter these attacks. Battleship secondary batteries and light cruiser main batteries by this time were also director controlled with telephone transmission of range and deflection data sent from plot to the sight setter on the guns.

（到了日德蘭海戰時，魚雷已經擁有陀螺儀穩定，新的推進系統使它們能航行超過4000碼，而以扇面發射魚雷增加命中率的戰術也已經出現。當時投射魚雷的驅逐艦也比昔日魚雷艇更快、更大且更強。在這種情況下，主力艦更需要輕巡洋艦與驅逐艦的掩護才能對抗日益進步的魚雷攻擊。在那個時代，戰鬥艦的副砲與輕巡洋艦的主砲也已經由射控站指揮並透過電話來傳遞距離參數，至於偏轉角度則由砲塔上的光學測距儀提供。）

The statistics are very interesting. Of the 8 British destroyers lost at Jutland, 6 were hit by battleship or battlecruiser 5.9inch secondary guns. Of these, two were first disabled by light cruiser or destroyer gun fire. Of the remaining two, one was lost to a collision and the other was sunk by a destroyer torpedo after being disabled by light cruiser 105mm and destroyer 88mm guns. Of the 14 British destroyers damaged, 9 were hit by battleships or battlecruisers. Two survived single 12inch hits

（關於日德蘭海戰的統計數據相當有趣。英國大艦隊在日德蘭海戰折損的八艘驅逐艦中，六艘是背戰鬥艦與戰鬥巡洋艦的5.9吋副砲擊沈，另外兩艘先是被德國公海艦隊的巡洋艦或驅逐艦以火砲擊傷，隨後發生碰撞，其中一艘當場沈沒，另一艘又受到巡洋艦105mm火砲與驅逐艦88mm火砲擊癱，最後被驅逐艦的魚雷解決。而英國大艦隊14艘受創的驅逐艦中，9艘是被德國戰鬥艦與戰鬥巡洋艦所傷，其中兩艘甚至是在挨了12吋主砲彈之後僥倖生還。）

Of the 5 German destroyers lost, only one was caused by a battleship - 13.5inch main battery fire from HMS Iron Duke. Five of the 12 damaged were hit by battleship or battle cruiser 6inch secondary batteries. Two others were damaged by splinters from battleship main battery near misses.

（德國公海艦隊5艘沈沒的驅逐艦中，只有一艘是被英國鐵公爵號戰鬥艦的13.5吋火砲擊沈。12艘受創驅逐艦裡，5艘是被英國戰鬥艦或戰鬥巡洋艦的6吋副砲所傷，另有兩艘則是被英國戰鬥艦主砲的近失彈破片所傷。）

In exchange, the British destroyer torpedo attacks on the German battle line hit one German battle cruiser in daylight and one predreadnought battleship at night. The only German torpedo success on the British battle line was not from a destroyer but from a light cruiser on a battleship.

（英國驅逐艦在白晝的戰鬥中以魚雷擊中一艘德國戰鬥巡洋艦（編者註：即賽德利茲號），並在夜間以魚雷擊沈一艘德國的前無畏級戰鬥艦（編者註：即波美拉尼亞號）。而德國方面只有一次成功的魚雷攻擊（編者註：擊中英國海軍馬爾波羅號戰鬥艦），發射魚雷的是一艘輕巡洋艦而非驅逐艦。）
　　
My conclusion, battleship secondary batteries were very important. Good shooting on destroyers can also be done using director controlled main guns.

（我引述這些戰例的重點是：副砲對戰鬥艦是非常重要的，此外由射控系統指揮主砲亦能對驅逐艦進行有效的射擊。）
　　
I would also like to point out the Battle of Samar as an interesting case study of daylight destroyer torpedo attack disrupting cruiser and even battleship battle formations. As for Surigao Straits - technology also played a vital role. DESRON 54 had tracked Nishimura s force on radar for a long time while remaining undetected by hiding close to Hibuson Island (dark background - hard to see and hard to detect using radar). The Japanese did not see the US destroyers and switch on search lights until torpedoes were already in the water.

（同時我也要喜歡引用薩瑪島海戰中，驅逐艦在白晝以魚雷攻擊、擾亂巡洋艦乃至於戰鬥艦的隊形的案例。在蘇利高海峽戰役，科技扮演了重要的角色；是役中，美軍第54驅逐艦戰隊利用雷達長時間跟蹤了日軍西村艦隊，但他們本身則憑藉西布森島的掩護而無法被雷達察覺。直到美國驅逐艦射出魚雷，日本艦隊始終沒有及時察覺並開啟探照燈。）
　　
Finally, there were three actions in 1965 that were setbacks for the ROCN. In addition to the one you mentioned, Tung Kiang was damaged by 2 Hainan class PGs on May 1st and while the PCE Chien Men and the PC Chiang Kiang were both sunk on August 6th by 4 Shanghai class PGs and 11 P6 class PT. In the latter battle, even proximity fuzed 3inch 50 shells were not effective against the torpedo boats. Stabilized guns - preferably directed by radar were needed. Hence the development of the indigenous Type 62 fire control system using gyros taken from retired F-86 fighters. Hats off to ROCN ingenuity

（最後，提一下1965年三場與中華民國海軍有關的海戰。在5月1日，東江號巡邏艦被二艘海南級巡邏艇（編者註：應為四艘上海級砲艇）擊傷；在8月6日，劍門與章江二艦被中共4艘上海級砲艇與11艘P6魚雷艇（編者註：應為P4魚雷艇）擊沈。在8月6日的戰鬥中，國府海軍即便用3吋50倍徑快砲也無法有效壓制中共的魚雷艇，顯示中華民國海軍迫切需要雷達導控且具有穩定系統的新式艦砲。隨後中華民國海軍發展出62式火砲射控系統，使用拆自除役的F-86戰機的陀螺穩定儀發展而成，是中華民國海軍一項頗富創意的設計。）

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